Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 45

Issue 1

Article 1

1956

Torts and the Atom: The Problem of Insurance
Charles M. Cable
George Washington University

William N. Early
George Washington University

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the Torts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Cable, Charles M. and Early, William N. (1956) "Torts and the Atom: The Problem of Insurance," Kentucky
Law Journal: Vol. 45: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol45/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Torts and the Atom:
the Problem of Insurance
By CHARL s M. CABLE* AND WmLa

m

N. EARLY*

INTRODUCrION

TM ATOMIC ENERGY AcT of 1954' ushered in what may be a
revolution in industry. With it the secrets of the atom, heretofore
reserved for military use only, were opened to the general industrial public. Some grandiose claims were made for the future of
the atomic industry, but the general feeling was one of mystifica-

tion. Because of lack of knowledge brought about both by the
extended period of secrecy and the relative uniqueness of the
field, the initial leadership came from those firms which had done
contract work for the Government. Two years later, however,
many firms are moving ahead at top speed to enter the field.2 One
principal area of great interest at present is the production of
electrical energy by atomic fission. 3 This will be done by the use
of heat from a reactor in an otherwise conventional steam operated
generating plant. The first commercial atomic energy plant for
producing electricity has been begun.4 It would appear that with
" J.D., George Washington University; attorney, Senath, Missouri.
00 J.D., George Washington University; attorney, Federal Trade Commission,
Washington, D.C.
1 68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. sec. 2011-81 (Supp. II 1955).
2 Fifty-four private electric companies have invested more than three billion dollars in planning and construction of atomic electric power plants. They
are engaged in building seven large and medium reactor plants and two small ones.
Ninety-five electric companies are actively engaged in research, planning or study
programs. Access permits have been issued to 87 electric companies. "What
Others Think," 57 Pub. Ut. Fort. 472 (1956). "In the field of military reactor
development, .. . the USS Nautilus, powered by the Submarine Thermal Reactor,
Mark II, had steamed more than 25,000 miles and the reactor continued to operate
satisfactorily.... Prospects for nuclear powered flight continue to show promise."
AEC, Nineteenth Semiannual Report 40 (1956). Plans for an atomic powered
locomotive were discussed by Senator Butler who sponsored legislation to aid in
building it. Washington Sunday Star, April 8, 1956.
3 What Others Think, supra. note 2.
Excavation for the Pressurized Water Reactor at Shippingport, Pa. was begun in July, 1956. Modified reactors have been proposed by Yankee Atomic
Electric Co. and Consolidated Edison Co. Report, supra at 40-41. The Dresden
plant of Consolidated Edison will be built some 50 miles south of Chicago, Ill. at
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the technical difficulties overcome that the atomic energy industry

would develop rapidly.
However, if the harnessing of the atom has opened a new
world for exploitation, it has also brought many new legal prob-

lems.5 The great deterrent to further development and expansion
has been the inability of the industry to obtain the necessary protection against third party liability, for a breakdown in a reactor.
The grim spectacle facing prospective businessmen wishing to
enter the field of atomic power is the possibility of a reactor accident.6 Accustomed to think of a runaway reactor in terms of the
explosions at Nagasaki or Einewetok, the entrepreneur is justifiably cautious.7 In this vein of thinking his attorney is equally
a cost of forty-five million dollars (and at a loss). What Others Think, supra;
AEC, Eighteenth Semiannual Report 103 (1955).
5 Senator Anderson offered these "legal brain twisters:"
"1. How do you prove or disrove negligence in the atomic energy industry if
the operations are shrouded in secrecy?
2. If radiation damage appears, how do you prove which of several possible
radiations caused the damage?
3. If radiation damage appears after a long period of time and you can
prove where the damage came from, how do you collect of (sic) the
organization responsible is no longer in business?
4. If radiation causes damage to the genes in a parent, to whom does the
right of action belong-the parent or the deformed child?
5. If it takes an Einstein to understand the theory of relativity, how can a
jury decide whether a reactor is run negligently or carefully?"
Address before the Northeastern Regional Meeting of the American Bar
Association, Hartford, Connecticut, April 16, 1956.
6 "We are going to make the Dresden reactor just as safe as it is humanly
possible to do. We believe we will end up with a reactor that is so safe that the
anger of serious atomic accident will be too remote to cause any apprehension.
...And in the extremely remote, but nevertheless real, contingency o an atomic
catastrophe, the number and amount of claims for resulting injuries and damage
may reach very large proportions." Statement of Philip Sporn, President of American Gas & Electric Co. quoted in "What Others Think," supra, at 475. "I am
not taking the position that these reactors are necessarily a great hazard. I
think there is an element of hazard there.... As a matter of fact, I do not know
why they would not be built right within 50 or 75 miles-at least that far awayfrom a big city, so in case there was an explosion and a contamination of the
area, it could possibly be isolated to a certain extent anyway." Remarks of Rep.
Holifield, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 405-06, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
7 This is probably not the correct view of the hazards involved. "The major
hazard involved is not heat or blast, as commonly assumed, but radiation emanating from the highly radioactive fission products accumulated within the reactor
as waste during periods of operation. These fission products are more toxic than
any substance heretofore known, and more insidious. They can neither be seen
nor felt .... A major reactor accident could result in the release of large quantities
of these fission products into the atmosphere, contaminating a wide geographic
area." Speech of Senator Clinton P. Anderson, Chairman of the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, before the Northeastern Regional Meeting of the American
Bar Association, Hartford, Conn. (April 16, 1956).
However, the public at least still is unconvinced. At the recent explosion in
the Sylvania Corporation's atomic laboratories in Bayside, New York, the general
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somber. Coupled with the thought of unlimited destruction is the
equally despairing thought of unlimited liability. Established
businesses think in terms of loss of corporate assets, and investors
think of destruction of a fledgling business. Such thinking has
made businessmen put insurance for third party liability at the
very head of the list of necessaries for entrance into the atomic
field." But the insurance industry also is aware of the possibility
of unlimited destruction and unlimited liability and consequently
is reluctant to offer full coverage. In this last respect the field is
clouded by the lack of information as to accident possibilities and
the scope of injury. 10 The exemplary accident record achieved by
the Government during its operation of reactors has had the unmanager felt called upon to issue a statement "to calm fears." However, 15 firemen and policemen received doses of radiation requiring periodic checkups. The
blasts resulted from ignition of thorium metal scrap, a mildly radioactive material
used in non-atomic industry process for many years. Washington Post and Times
Herald, July 3, 1956, p. 1, col. 8.
The location of the reactor may solve some problems, but what of the mobile
reactor plants in ships or railroad locomotives?
8 "To a certain limited degree a given manufacturer could limit some of his
liability by means of careful contract language and indemnity provisions. Such
provisions will be of relatively little value particularly against third-party claims
because the supplier of the defective component is not necessarily going to be able
financially to back up his contract to the degree necessary to save his vendee
harmless, and contractual dickering and fencing is not going to solve the broad
social problem of protecting the public." MacMackn, Insurance Problems of
the Atomic Industry, 1954 Ins. L. 3. 726, 727. But a contract cannot save
the owner of the reactor. "It is my personal judgment that the Dresden project
can not proceed to final completion with the insurance issue up in the air. At
somepoint-and the earlier the better-we need to kow that the problem will be
solved. Until that point is reached, we are going to have progressively more difficulty in justifying the heavy financial contribution which we are putting into the
project and which, without insurance, could leave us at the date of operation
with a plant that prudence might not permit us to operate." Sporn, note 6 supra.
"Assuming that the money to build a reactor would be forthcoming, there remains
a very great worry about protection against consequences of atomic accidents....
[Tihis is not a new worry, but it becomes more acute as we near the day of
private operation. This worry is shared by the equipment manufacturers and all
others who would have identifiable responsibilities for parts of a reactor or its
operation, as well as by the prospective owner of the facility." Statement of Paul
W. McQuillen, Hearings, note 6 supra, at 257. But cf. "One topic which is the
subject of a great deal of discussion currently is that of liability and insurance. We
do not consider this question a real deterrent in our case. Our system is a large
one and accordingly we can assume substantial risks." Statement of H. R. Searing,
Hearings, note 6 supra, at 403.
14See MacMackin, Insurance Problems of the Atomic Industry, 1954 Ins. L. J.
726. The private insurance industry has indicated that it will offer 65 million
dollar coverage against third-party liability.
10 See Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy 126-28 (1956), hereafter called Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. "There
are several reasons why, at the present time, conventional insurance techniques
seem inadequate to cope with public liability insurance against atomic hazards.
Fundamental . . . is the fact that the risk has yet to be accurately evaluated, in
terms of either (1) the likelihood of an atomic catastrophe, (2) the magnitude
of the potential damage, (3) the persons who might, ultimately, be held to share
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happy facet of confusing the insurance underwriters. However,
American industry, sensing the vast and lucrative fields just over
the horizon of the atomic industry, are ever pressing forward."
Although the first case of an action for damages caused by a
reactor accident has not yet been handed down, the law which
will be applied in the areas of potential liability has become
settled over a period of years. The result of such an accident
would be to release radioactive waste materials info the atmosphere. Thus there could be injury from exposure to radiation outside the body; i.e. from radioactive material lying on the ground;
and exposure and deterioration of body tissues from radioactive
materials taken into the body in food, water and air. The three
most likely defendants are the Federal Government, the owner or
operator of the reactor and the manufacturer of the reactor or its
component parts. This paper will attempt to set the problems
faced by the atomic energy industry in the perspective of the law
of torts. It will be concerned primarily with the possible consequences of a reactor breakdown and the consequent dispersion
of radioactive materials into the atmosphere.
The insurance industry recognizing the legal problems involved as well as the possibility of great loss has been trying for
some time to adapt itself to meet this new need. This paper will
also try to evaluate the insurance problems which will face private
business as it enters the new field of atomic power. It will be primarily concerned with insurance as a risk-shifting device for the
risk of loss due to legal liability for injuries running from minor
health hazards of employees to the extreme of potential damage
resulting from a runaway reactor.
LikBmrr oF =E GovRWMrr
Until the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 all
atomic activities were carried on by the United States Governin the liability for such a catastrophe, or (4), the basis upon which legal liability
may be asserted against such persons." Background Material for the Report of the
Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 509 (1956).
11 See statement of Paul W. McQuillan, note 6 supra. "Risks in this stage of
the development tend to be high. It seems to us, however, to be much too early
for private enterprise to concede defeat on the insurance problem. . . .We are
not satisfied that the time has yet arrived to reconsider the need for a Federal
atomic insurance program covering peaceful uses. . . . We look on a Federal
atomic insurance program as a threat to private atomic enterprise, not a benefit."
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 128.
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ment. There are no causes brought to court for injuries arising
from experiments under the Act of 1946. With the Act of 1954 the
use of atomic energy has been opened to the general public under
a somewhat restricted licensing program. However, section 52
provides that "all rights, title, and interest in or to any special
nuclear material within or under the jurisdiction of the United
States, now or hereafter produced, shall be the property of the
United States and shall be administered and controlled by the
Commission as agent of and on behalf of the United States by
virtue of this Act."'1 2 Retention of title to all special nuclear material is considered necessary to the security and defense of the
nation. However, it raises the interesting question of possible
joint liability of the government and some licensee involved in a
nuclear accident. The Congress must have anticipated such a
situation for subsection e (8) states that "the licensee will hold
the United States and the Commission harmless from any damages resulting from the use or possession of special nuclear material by the licensee.' 3 This is considered to mean and to have
the legal effect of providing that the licensees must pay for all
damages even though the special nuclear materials which they
may be using under license belong to the Federal Government
and even though all Commission and local regulations are fully
obeyed.1 4 This does not exculpate the Government from liability
in the event of an accident in a government owned reactor power
plant, or some other property of the Government. The fantastic
safety record of the Government in this respect does not remove
the disquieting possibility of damage caused by the negligence of
the Government or its employees in the operation of a Government reactor.
Suits against the Government must depend upon the Federal
Tort Claims Act.'5 There is an exception made to exempt any
negligence arising out of an act involving discretion or a discretionary function by a Government agency or employee. 16 The
12 68 Stat. 929-30 (1954), 42 U.S.C. sec. 63 (Supp. II 1955).
1i3 ibid.
'4 Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
to the joint Committee on Atomic Energy. See. 14.4 (1956); Marks and Trowbridge, Framework for Atomic Industry 103 (1955).
15 28 U.S.C. sees. 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80

1'6 The provisions of this chapter and section 1346 (b) of this title shall not
apply to-
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cases which have arisen against the Government at this date have
had to face the discretionary exception to the waiver of Governmental immunity. It would be well, therefore, to recognize the
problems faced by a possible litigant in this field.
The case of Dalehite v. United States17 is the outstanding
authority interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act and the discretionary exception. In that case there was an explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer stored in vessels M Texas City harbor
causing extensive property damage and many deaths. There was
evidence to the effect that the Government knew that the principal ingredient of the fertilizer was a component of high explosives, and it was charged that the Government was negligent in
using such a material without giving notice that it might explode
under certain conditions. The fertilizer had been made in powder
manufacturing plants which had previously made war materials
for the United States. It was being shipped to Europe to aid in
relieving famine conditions by increasing productivity. The Supreme Court found that there was no negligence involved, but
went beyond this to lay down significant principles. It found that
the decisions to institute the fertilizer export program at cabinet
level (as well as the decision not to take further safety measures)
were discretionary acts. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the
majority, stated that "where there is room for policy judgment
and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of
subordinates in carrying out the operations of Government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable. .

.

. In

short, the alleged 'negligence' does not subject the Government
to liability. The decisions held culpable were all responsibly made
at a planning rather than operational level and involved considerations more or less important to the practicability of the Government's fertilizer program."' The Court handled the allegation of
liability without fault on the ground that the fertilizer constituted
a nuisance wvith the conclusion that the Tort Claims Act required
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether
or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty

on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. sec. 2680 (1952).
17346 U.S. 15 (1953).
is Id. at 36, 42.
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the finding of some negligent act which was not necessary under
the doctrine of absolute liability. "[Ilt is our judgment that liability does not arise by virtue either of United States ownership of
an 'inherently dangerous commodity' or property, or of engaging

in an 'extra hazardous' activity."' 9
The decision of this case would be the first obstacle for the
damaged litigant to overcome. The second would be the interpretation given to the term "discretionary function." There
have been many conflicting definitions some of which seem to
abuse the intention of the framers of the statute. 0
The Supreme Court refused to allow the application of absolute liability under the Tort Claims Act because it felt this would
defeat the concept of liability only for negligence.2 ' However,
some lower courts have permitted use of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in actions for injury against the Government. This
doctrine rests on the assumption that no injury could have occurred without some negligent act and therefore would appear to be
not in conflict with the theory of the Tort Claims Act.22 The long
successful use of atomic reactors by the Government's contractors
without serious accident would indicate that should some disaster
occur there must have been some lessening of attention or failure
19 Id. at 45. But cf. "Where experiment or research is necessary to determine
the presence or the degree of danger, the product must not be tried out on the
publc, nor must the public be expected to possess the facilities or the technical
knowledge to learn for itself of inherent but latent dangers. . . . We believe it is
the better view that whoever puts into circulation in commerce a product that is
known or even suspected of being potentially inflammable or explosive is under
an obligation to know his own product and to ascertain what forces he is turning
loose." 346 U.S. at 52, 53 (dissent). It is interesting to note the language here
which is particularly apposite to a case arising from an atomic disaster. It can be
expected that this language will be much in consideration should such a situation
arise.
20 See Olson v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 150 (D.N.Dak. 1950) where the
court seems to equate exercise of judgment and discretionary function. This
rationale is criticized in Note, Application of Discretionary Function Exception of
Federal Tort Claims Act, 36 Marq. L. Rev. 88 (1952). For types of cases in
which this argument has been used see Note, The Discretionary Function Clause
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 716 (1955).
21 The theory of absolute liability without fault of the Government was rejected in United States v. Ure, 225 F. 2d 709 (1955). Here an irrigation supply
canal operated by the United States broke flooding land below it. The district
court gave judgment for the plaintiff on the theory of absolute liability enunciated
in Rvlands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1869). The circuit court reversed and
based this portion of its decision on the interpretation given in Dalehite.
22 This argument was allowed in United States v. Ure, supra, even though the
circuit court noted that the trial court had mistakenly considered res ipsa loquitur
as merely a modem version of absolute liability. See also United States v. Hall,
195 F. 2d 64 (1st Cir. 1952).
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to perform some necessary act. 23 The same considerations applying here would also apply to private owners of reactors. This is
taken up in more detail in the following pages. However, the lack
of information available to the plaintiff in such a case might be
increased by refusal of the Government to call witnesses in the
interest of national security. In Williams v. United States24 a B-47
aircraft exploded and disintegrated over Marianay, Florida, showering flaming debris over the city. Plaintiff's children were burned
and died from injuries caused by wreckage which fell near his
home. Plaintiff could not prove negligence but based his cause of
action on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The government attorney
told the court that no witnesses would be called because of
national security. Faced with this dilemma the court took notice
of the experimental activities of the Air Force which are the result
of decisions made at a cabinet level. Thus the rationale of Dalehite controlled and plaintiff was out of court.
The only two cases involving suits against the Government
for damages from atomic activities arose out of the atomic tests
at the Nevada Proving Grounds. While these tests are more
clearly within the area of discretion than an ordinary use of an
atomic reactor, the decisions may be milestones in the development of law in this field. In the first 25 plaintiff's ranch buildings
were damaged by the violence of shock waves from the atomic
explosion. Plaintiff's claims of negligence were based on the alleged failure of a Government testing agent to place microbarographs in the direction of plaintiff's ranch to observe the effect of
23 The accident rate in 1949 was 4.94 injuries per million man-hours compared to 11.49 in the rest of industry. See Dean, The Impact of The Atom on
Law, 12 Pitt. L. Rev. 514 (1951). The operating history of 25 reactors in the
United States for the years 1943 to 1954 shows no accidents involving radiation
injury sufficient to cause lost time of personnel during some 600,000 operating
hours and 17 million man-hours. Speech of Clark C. Vogel, General Counsel of
the AEC, before the Seminar in Control and Use of Atomic Energy, (March 27,
1956).
24 115 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Fla. 1953). The court recognized the difculty of
showing how the Tort Claims Act was not applicable since there was no evidence
introduced.
25 Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Calif. 1955).
The court also rejected the theories of liability based on absolute liability without
fault and res ipsa loquitur. As to the latter it said, "The injury complained of in
the instant case is the cracked plaster in the buildings located on the plaintiff's
ranch. In the first place the evidence does not establish what 'thing' caused the
injury and in the second place that the 'accident' is of such a nature that it
ordinarily occurs in the absence of negligence, i.e. from temperature changes and
earth tremors. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application in situations
such as this."
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an experimental testing explosion. It was argued that the discretion of the agent in selection of the sites of the instruments was
not of the discretionary character of the exception to section 2680.
The court rejected these arguments and rendered judgment for
defendant on,the ground that the decision to conduct experiments
in atomic energy at the particular place was one made at high
level and for the public benefit. It felt that to say that the decisions made in carrying out the basic plan are not discretionary
would be contrary to the intent of Congress and the Dalehite case.
The second such case2" was brought by sheepherders for injuries to their herds caused by the atomic tests. The government
attorneys moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
Federal Tort Claims Act does not authorize suit against the Government for negligent conduct of nuclear tests. The court wrestled
with the issue and denied the motion to dismiss. Its analysis
breaks down the series of decisions necessary to conduct an atom
explosion and considers each separately.
The decision to make the test and the means involved as a matter of necessity or convenience may have
been decided in the exercise of a proper discretion. Yet, because of inattention to the minimum requirements of ordinary care, no notice of an impending detonation may have
been given to a herder whose flocks were in the area clearly
to be affected. There may have been clear knowledge of
the danger to the sheep. If the failure to give notice reasonably could be attributed to a discretionary decision at any
level that such notice would be impractical or would interfere with the carrying out of the project or would involve
wasted time without justification, the Court might not be
permitted to weigh exercise of that discretion
to see whether
27
it comported with due care or was abused.
The court concluded that negligent performance after discretion
has been exercised and not involving any discretionary power is
not contemplated by the "discretionary function" exception. It
refused to look at the overall nature of the project. Another question arose though it was not argued by the parties. This was
2
OBulloch
2

v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955).
7Id. at 888-89. The court also flirts with the idea of absolute liability for
blasting and the use of explosives. It said that the fact that absolute liability may
be imposed under state law against individuals does not relieve the Government
where negligence is established.
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whether section 167 of the Act of 195428 indicates an intention of
Congress that there should be relief other than under the Tort
Claims Act. The court held that this provision was not inconsistent with the earlier act, and merely indicated an intention to
provide for administrative settlement of claims not maintainable

under

29

it.

Despite the above case the pattern seems clear that it will be
difficult to establish the liability of the Government for atomic
accidents. The discretionary functions exception of the Tort
Claims Act encompasses almost all activities in this field. The
question of liability arising out of ownership of special nuclear
material is apparently removed by statute although this awaits a
decision which it is hoped will never come. Thus the chance of
getting an additional defendant who is always capable of paying
the damages seems to be unlikely. It is difficult to see how the
present activities of the Government in the atomic energy field
could be anything but discretionary. The only possible way of
having government liability would be through some quasi-governmental activity. If the Government were to establish a TVA-like
corporation to furnish electric power, then the question of liability
for the activity would arise. At the present time, however, in light
of the experimental nature of atomic industry, it seems that the
Government could easily argue that in operating such a plant it
was exercising some policy-making discretion to further the development of the industry. Certainly the production of electric
power by atomic energy at this stage of its development would be
the result of a discretionary decision just as was the decision to
export fertilizer in the Dalehite case. With this background the
chances of government liability seem slim indeed.
LiABILIY OF REACTOR OwiEmS AND OPERAToRs

The first person likely to become a defendant in a suit for injuries occasioned by a reactor accident is the owner or operator
of the reactor. The one in this unenviable position may find himself confronted with more than the burden of proving himself not
28

68 Stat. 952 (1954), 42 U.S.C. sec. 2207 (Supp. II, 1955).

This section

authorized the AEC to settle claims of $5000 or less for injuries resulting from any
detonation, explosion, or radiation produced in the conduct of weapons tests under
certain conditions.
29 133 F. Supp. at 893.
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negligent in his operation of the reactor. Just how far his liability
will be increased because of his selection of atomic energy as the
basis for his industry will depend upon the thinking of the court
and the persuasiveness of the attorneys for the plaintiff. As to the
latter it is easy to forsee that they will advocate strict liability
without fault. In the alternative they will attempt to shift the
burden of proof to the owner by use of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. While somewhat related in the results achieved, these
two doctrines are not similar either in theory or in operation. A
knowledge of the two is essential to understanding the problem
at hand.
Strict Liability Without Fault
The application of this concept of tort liability does not depend upon the fault of the alleged tort-feasor, but upon his position in society as one better able to absorb and pass on the risk.30
Whether this theory is consonant with the position of a reactor
owner in today's industry will be considered later.
In any argument for strict liability the case of Rylands v.
Fletcher ' will loom large. In that case the defendant had a
reservoir constructed on his land for water. He employed a competent engineer and builder. In excavating the bed of the reservoir five old shafts were found which had been filled in with earth
of the same kind as that surrounding them. Unknown to defendant these shafts connected with other shafts which eventually
connected with plaintiff's coal mines. When the reservoir was
partially filled with water, the shafts burst and water flowed into
plaintiff's mines. It was admitted that there was no personal
negligence of defendant, but that reasonable care was not exercised by his employees. The Court of Exchequer could find no
cases directly in point and treated this as one of first instance.
Baron Bramwell thought that plaintiff had a right to be free from
"foreign water" that artificially was brought to a place where it
would flow on him. But Baron Martin, supported by Baron Pollock, felt that the act of bringing water on the land was not a
trespass nor a nuisance, and that the digging of a reservoir was a
lawful act. He thought that "to hold defendants liable would
Prosser, Torts 332 (2d ed. 1955); Morris, Torts 243, 249 (1953).
31 Fletcher v. Rylands and Horrocks, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), rev'd.
35 L. Rep., n.s. 154 (Ex. Ch. 1866), aff'd, L.R. 3. H.L. 330, 1 E.R.C. 236
(H.L. 1868)
30
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make them insurer against the consequence of a lawful act upon
their own land when they had no reason to believe or suspect that
any damage was likely to ensue."32 Judgment was rendered for
defendant. If the case had stopped here, perhaps the field of tort
law would be less confused.
However, this case was just beginning its career. On appeal
to the Court of the Exchequer Chamber the judgment for defendant was reversed in an opinion by Justice Blackburn which
contained the seeds of the confusion which followed it.
We think that the true rule of law is that the person who,
for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must
keep it in at his peril, and that, if he does not do so, he is
prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself
by shewing (sic) that the escape was owing to the plaintiffs
default, or perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of
vis-major, or the act of God .... 33
That such language would be extremely harmful to the defendant
reactor owner is obvious. However, the story does not end here
either. On further appeal to the House of Lords the judgment for
plaintiff was affirmed, but the rationale and language of Justice
Blackburn were limited. The true rule of the case was stated by
Lord Cairns:
...[I]f, in what I may term the natural user of the land,
there had been any accumulation of water ... the plaintiff
could not have complained.... On the other hand, if the
defendants, not stopping at the natural user of their close,
had desired to use it for any purpose which I may term a
non-natural user... and if in consequence the water came
to escape and pass off into the close of the plaintiff, then it
appears to me that that which the 34defendants were doing
they were doing at their own peril.
The doctrine of Rylands was at first rejected in American jurisdictions probably because of the breadth of the language of
Justice Blackburn. But the pendulum has swung to acceptance of
159 Eng. Rep. at 745.
33 35 L.J. Rep., n.s. at 156.
3
E.R.C. at 258. But cf. opinion of Lord Cranworth. If a person brings
or accumulates on his land anything which, if it should escape, may cause
damage to his neighbor, he does so at his peril. If it does escape and cause
damage he is responsible, however careful he may have been, and whatever
precautions he may have taken to prevent the damage." 1 E.R.C. at 260.
32

TORTS AND TnE ATOM

it in approximately twenty jurisdictions. 35 It has been accepted
36
by the Restatement of Torts in broad form.
One common area for the application of Rylands is that of
damages resulting from blasting or use of explosives.37 In the
more modem cases this has been extended to damage even from
physical vibrations or shock waves .3 In a recent Connecticut decision30 a building was damaged by vibrations from blasting carried on by the defendant at the instance of the United States Government for the purpose of widening the channel of a river to
prevent it from flowing into the downtown district of Norwich.
The court found no negligence, but held that "a person who uses
an intrinsically dangerous means to accomplish a lawful end, in
such a way as will necessarily or obviously expose the person of
another to the dangers of probable injury, is liable if injury results,
even though he uses all proper care." 40 While costly to the enterpriser, this rationale proceeds on the theory that he is the best
able to spread the risk and cost. Earlier cases perhaps wishing to
encourage initiative and the growth of industry were not so
generous to injured plaintiffs. In Heig v. Licht4' the defendant
kept fireworks in a powder magazine which had been constructed
with all due care. They exploded, injuring the plaintiff. The
court felt that keeping or manufacturing fireworks does not constitute negligence per se, but that this depended upon the
35 Prosser, 333-34.
36
"Except as stated in 521-4, one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity
is liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as
likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm
resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the
utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm." Rest. Torts 519.
"An activity is ultrabazardous if it
(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels
of others which can not be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care,
and
(b) is not a matter of common usage." Id. at 520.
It might be argued that subsection (a) might offer an out to the owner of the
reactor since apparently the risk of serious harm while potentially omnipresent may
be so controlled as to make it not a probability. The record of safety of American
and English reactors would seem to support this thought.
37 Morris divides the theories of liability of a blaster into three groups;
liability without fault even where use of explosives was justified; liability only if
the action was unjustifiable or improperly done; and, trespass theory for debris
thrown on adjoining property. Morris 243.
38 See Prosser 336 and cases cited therein.
30
Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Engineering Co., 79 A. 2d 591
(Conn. 1951).
40 79 A. 2d at 593.
4180 N.Y. 579 (1888).
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locality, quantity and surrounding circumstances and not entirely
upon the degree of care used. This decision seems to recognize a
sliding scale of care depending upon certain variables. It would
seem to require the conduct of a "reasonable explosive manufacturer". It does fail to recognize the superior risk-bearing capacity of the manufacturer.
Both English and American courts recognize an area of no
strict liability where there is a sanction given by statutory authority or local law to the acts and some desirable public benefit.4 2
Some courts have interpreted the statute as condoning the consequences in advance. In Northwestern Utility, Ltd. v. Gordon
Guaranty & Accident Co. 43 a hotel was destroyed by the escape of
gas from a welded joint in a pressure inain below the street level
belonging to defendant, a public utility company, caused by the
operations of the city in constructing a storm sewer. The Privy
Council thought that the carrying of inflammable and explosive
gas is prima facie within the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher and
laid the decision of the case on statutory construction. "Where
undertakers are acting under statutory powers it is a question of
construction, depending on the language of the statute, whether
they are only liable for negligence or whether they remain subject
to the strict and unqualified rule of Rylands v. Fletcher."44 Thus
where otherwise dangerous electric, gas or water circuits are laid
under statutory authority, there is no strict liability, and the
operator is liable only for negligence. 5
The question that arises from this analysis is whether the construction of an atomic reactor is natural or non-natural use of the
land in question. At the present it would be non-natural, but one
would think that at some time in the future atomic reactors would
become as natural as steam boilers or automobiles which have
not come under the doctrine of Rylands.46 Further, the use of an
42 Prosser 343.

[1936] A.C. 108 (Privy Council 1935).
[1936] A.C. at 120.
Dumphy v. Montreal Light Co., 76 L.J.P.C. 71 (electricity); Could v.
Winona Gas Co., 111 N.W. 254 (Minn. 1907) (gas); Green v. Chelsea Waterworks Co., 70 L.T. 547 (1894) (water).
46 In this connection it is interesting to note that the Restatement of Torts in
1939 considered aviation as being ultrahazardous in nature and advocated strict
liability. See Rest. Torts 520, comment. Yet there are decisions applying res ipsa
loquitur to aircraft accidents because of the feeling that planes do not crash in
the absence of negligence. See United States v. Kesinger, 190 F. 2d 529 (10th
43
44

45
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atomic reactor for power generation in an industrial area would
not be non-natural use of the land unless one continues to think in
terms of potential explosions. In Eng!and strict liability has been
confined to things or activities which are extraordinary or exceptional or abnormal. But at some time or other an activity
which is extraordinary because of its novelty becomes a commonplace in our society.
The theory behind strict liability without fault is that the
hazardous enterprise, even though socially desirable and valuable,
must pay its way and make good any damage resulting from it.4T
After all the enterprise is conducted for profit, and the person
profiting is in a better position to bear the risk of losses by in-

creasing prices or taking out insurance. Some have felt that in
certain cases the application of the doctrine should depend on a

balancing of the risk-bearing capacities of plaintiff and defendant.48 Thus the enterpriser who sets up a factory near defendant's
warehouse can increase the price of his products to pay for insurance better than plaintiff can increase his storage prices.49 In
the case of the atomic energy industry this analysis breaks down
because of the present impossibility of getting liability insurance.

Thus it may be easier for a home-owner to take out some type of
casualty insurance than for the reactor owner to get his own insurance. But the real danger is from the escape of radiation bearing particles. How could the population of an eastern city take
out insurance against injury from radiation drifting in from
some far-western plant? In addition, there would probably be
little enthusiasm for such a project since the type of insurance
would have to be of the life variety. Thus it is again clear that the
problems of insurance and torts are interwoven and entangled.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Should the counsel for plaintiff fail to convince the court of the
application of the doctrine of strict liability, it is easy to predict
that he will attempt to have the court consider the application of

res ipsa loquitur. This theory has the effect of a presumption of
negligence, and in effect shifts the burden of proof to the deCir. 1951). The earlier view has been considerably modified in many states. See
Prosser 346.
47 Prosser 332
48 Morris 250.
49 Ibid.
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fendant to show that he was not negligent. It is significant to note
here that even though the burden is shifted, there must be negligence to justify a verdict. Some have felt that res ipsa loquitur is
just the doctrine of strict liability under a more palatable guise, 0
but this view seems unjustified since the defendant is at least
given the opportunity of disproving the negligence charged. In
justification of this statement is the difference in the underlying
purposes of the two doctrines. The desire of strict liability is to
place the element of risk upon the party most able to bear it; the
theory of res ipsa loquitur is to place the burden of proof on the
person best able to explain the circumstances. It is this which
will have bearing on the application of the doctrine to the field of
atomic torts.
The English case of Byrne v. Boadle5' is the origin of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There the plaintiff was injured
while walking down the street by a flour barrel which fell out of a
window of defendant's building. The court found for the plaintiff
without the introduction of evidence of specific negligence. It
stated: "A barrel could not roll out of a warehouse without some
negligence, and to say that a plaintiff who is injured by it must
call witnesses from the warehouse to prove negligence seems to
me preposterous.... I think it apparent that the barrel was in
the custody of the defendant who occupied the premises, and
who is responsible for the acts of his servants who had control of
it.

"52

This case announces two conditions, which must be present
for the application of res ipsa loquitur: the injury would not ordinarily happen in the absence of negligence, and the object causing
the injury was under the exclusive control of defendant. To
these might be added a third: the absence of the possibility of
contributing conduct which would make plaintiff responsible. 3
However, a perusal of the many cases decided under this theory
indicates that it has much broader scope in keeping with the
underlying policy of it.54 Thus the element of control was found
50
Ure v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 779, 788 (D. Ore. 1954), rev'd. 225 F.
2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955).
51 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
52 Id. at 301.
53 See Prosser 199; San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U.S. 89,
32 Sup.
5 Ct. 399, 56 L. ed. 680 (1912).
in an action under the Federal Employee's Liability Act the trial court
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in the duty of a common carrier to its passenger to use care in
operation of the vehicle. 55 In a more recent case the doctrine was
applied to an even broader fact situation. In Haasman v. Pacific
Alaska Air Expressr6 an airplane left Yakutat, Alaska and was
never again seen or heard from. The plaintiff relied on res ipsa
loquitur. The court found that this doctrine was applicable
where plaintiff has equal knowledge of the facts, but that equality
of ignorance of both parties would not preclude application. It
fet that the function of the doctrine was to supply a fact-defendant's negligence-which must have existed in the causal chain
which plaintiff cannot because of circumstances know or be expected to prove. This case seems to end the "dubious" condition5 7
that the evidence of the true facts in the case must be more
accessible to the defendant.
In the field of atomic energy industry there is a likelihood that
an accident would not happen in the absence of negligence. The
safety record of the industry thus far would almost compel this
conclusion.58 The control of the defendant is also present, and
defendant is surely in a better position than the plaintiff to prove
or disprove specific acts of negligence. Furthermore, the possibility that plaintiff was a contributing cause would not arise in
the absence of a suit by a workman or a trespasser, except in the
a pplied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The circuit court reversed on the ground
at the defendant must have exclusive control of all the things used in an
operation which might probably have caused the injury. Here the non-exclusively
controlled factors were clearly shown not to have causal connection with the accident. On appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed. "We cannot
agree . . . [R]es ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant the
inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference; that they furnish
circumstantial evidence of negligence where direct evidence of it may be lacking,
but it is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; that
the-y call for explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily that they require it; that they
make a case to be decided by the jury; not that they forestall the verdict. Thus,
the question here really is not whether the application of the rule relied on fits
squairely into some judicial definition, rigidly construed, but whether the circumstances were such as to justify a finding that this derailment was a result of the
defendant's negligence." Jesionowski v. Boston & M.R.R., 329 U.S. 452, 457
1947 quoting Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 33 Sup. Ct. 416, 57 L. ed. 815
(1918).
55lCapital Transit v. Jackson, 149 F. 2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
56 100 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska 1951).
57 Prosser 201.
58 See note 23, supra. "The operating history of 25 reactors in the United
States from 1943 to 1954 discloses no radiation injury sufficiently serious to cause
lost time to personnel during 606,686 operating hours and 17,799,000 man-hours.
There were two fatalities in accidents occurring in laboratories working with
fissionable materials." Speech of Clark C. Vogel, General Counsel of the AEC,
before the Seminar in Control and Use of Atomic Energy, March 27, 1956.
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event of a known escape of radiation materials and a disregard of
safety measures by the plaintiff. Thus, in theory at least, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would be available to the injured
party.
OrdinaryNegligence
Last on the descending scale of aid to the plaintiff is liability
of the reactor owner for negligence only. Here the plaintiff would
have the customary duty of pleading and proving negligence.
The question which must be faced is whether this burden is too
great to be applied in this situation in the light of such an "ethereal touchstone" as public policy. The great difficulty of proving
proximate cause in such cases might be enough to impress the
court with the unequal burdens of the parties. The insidious
quality of radiation poisoning and the as-yet unknown effects of
it are such as to make proof of it almost impossible. The amount
of radiation escaping might be so slight as to make long periods
of exposure necessary to cause visible injury. The skill of medical
science in this field is still undeveloped. The potentiality of injury may take years to discover, such as mutations in genes or
the gradual disintegration of some internal organ resulting in
eventual weakness and death. Thus, proof of causal connection
would be difficult. At present, at least, the abilities which the
plaintiff would be able to bring to bear on the issue of negligence
seem too limited to force him to depend entirely on his own skills
in proving negligence.

Summary
Whether the doctrine of negligence applied in the case of injuries from some atomic accident is strict liability, res ipsa loquitur
or negligence only will probably depend more than anything else
on the circumstances and time of the first case. The feeling at
present as indicated by the text-writers and law review articles
seems to be that strict liability will be applied.5" This appears to
be due to the conception of an atomic accident as some sort of
Hiroshima-like tragedy, and to the uncommon quality of reactors.
When reactors are as common as automobiles, or at least as com59 Prosser 886; Becker and Huard, Tort Liability and the Atomic Energy Industry, 44 Geo. L.J. 58, 68 (1955).
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mon as steam boilers, then the justifications for application of
strict liability are diminished. Further, if the government-controlled atomic energy industry had not been so accident-free,
perhaps the problems of what legal theory and scope of liability
would apply would be simplified. A history of minor accidents
would serve to remove from the public mind the explosive force
for which the atom has been utilized. The ignorance of the public in this matter at this time will serve to increase the scope of
liability of the reactor owner. Should the accident arise at some
subsequent date when reactors are more common the courts
should be more lenient. However, the dilemma is that of needing
a history of the effects of accidents before the first accident case.
This seems to be impossible. Until such time as the effects of an
atomic accident are known or at least more ably predicted, the
position of the owner-operator is indeed precarious.
LiAmrBrry OF TEE MANUFAcTurrE
REACTOR OR

RELATED

OR DESIGNER OF

ITEM

Should the unhappy reactor owner or operator be charged
with liability for the accident resulting from radiation escape
from his instrument, he may wish to join the manufacturer or
even the designer of it. This would offer a desirable reduction or
elimination of damages in the event he could prove himself free
from negligence and the manufacturer could settle the claims.
However, the owner would not have the advantage of some
scale-loading device like strict liability or res ipsa loquitur. He
would be forced to prove actual negligence of the manufacturer
in the construction of the apparatus. That this would be difficult
if the reactor were destroyed by the accident is obvious. But, as
is more likely, there would probably be some lesser type of
damage, and after a sufficient cooling off time, the instrument
involved could be examined. At that time the reactor owner
would wish to explore the possibilities of "sticking" the manufacturer with the responsibilities for the accident. That he could
do this if he could prove negligence is shown by the whole pattern
of modern law.
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Liability of the Manufacturer
The case that comes quickest to a lawyer's mind when he
thinks of the liability of a manufacturer for an accident caused by
his article is MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co.60 This case was the
culmination of a long series of cases and legal thinking and has
been the beginning of a further train of cases. There the plaintiff
was injured when the wheel of his automobile collapsed throwing
him out of the automobile. The wheel was not manufactured by
defendant but was purchased from another independent manufacturer. The automobile was sold to a retail dealer and was then
resold to plaintiff. It was found that a reasonable inspection by
defendant would have disclosed the defect. The issue presented
to the court was "whether the defendant owed a duty of care
and vigilance to anyone but the immediate purchaser?""' The
court in an opinion written by the great Judge Cardozo leaped the
intervening hurdles of privity of contract. It reviewed the cases
of inherently dangerous objects which could be a source of danger
to many people if constructed carelessly and the duty of the
manufacturer of such an object to see that it was so constructed.
In answer to the argument that a wheel of an automobile is not
an inherently dangerous thing, Judge Cardozo stated: "If the
nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of
danger.... There must be knowledge of a danger, not merely

possible, but probable." 2 Thus, the court overcame the double
objections of no privity of contract6" and not an inherently dangerous object.
It would be impossible to relate the many cases64 which have
been decided under this rationale, but it may be stated that its
effect on the law has been profound. Of these many cases a few
might be considered as bearing on the problem at hand.
N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
61 111 N.E. at 1051.
62
Id. at 1053.
63
Prosser 500. In Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F. 2d 359 (1st Cir. 1934)
the defendant manufactured a coffee urn which was sold to a caterer who rented
it to plaintiff. The urn toppled over spilling hot coffee on plaintiff. The trial judge
told the jury that the manufacturer would be held liable for negligence in manufacture to any person using the article for the purpose and in the manner intended
even though not a privy to the contract with the manufacturer. This was upheld
on appeal. See also Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (1956), cert. denied June 11,
1956.
64 It is said that it is "all but universal law in the United States." Prosser 500.
60217
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In DeVito v. United Air Lines 5 the defendant used airplanes
built by defendant Douglas on its lines. The particular model
had been grounded after fires had broken out on several occasions.
Douglas made modifications which satisfied the CAA, including
those on the plane in question. Douglas knew that when the fire
control units were sending CO 2 into the baggage compartment,
the pilots were adversely affected by the CO 2. Douglas conducted
a clinic to ascertain the effects of this, but the report of the findings was not transmitted to United before the accident. The report recommended that pilots wear oxygen masks since the cockpit would be filled with CO 2 should the fire control units be used.
The court found the defendant United liable for "the negligence
or want of skill of anyone who has been concerned in the manufacture of any portion of the apparatus."66
A somewhat similar rationale was used in Chapman Chemical
Co. v. Taylor. 7 There an aerial spraying company bought 2-4-D
dust for weeding rice fields from the defendant. Dusting was
quite common and experience showed that the dust ordinarily
did not drift more than 50 feet beyond the area being treated.
Defendant knew from tests of other manufacturers that 2-4-D
floated for great distances, 68 but it used it in the same manner
that it would use a less volatile item. This resulted in the injury
to plaintiff's cotton crop. The court thought that forseeability of
injury and not privity of contract was the test. The actual
ignorance of defendant as to the carrying power of the dust was
69
not material in its defense.
Out of these and similar cases seems to arise a duty of a manufacturer to warn of any possible dangers which may arise from
the use of its product. In one case the manufacturer actually
knew of the dangers involved and negligently failed to transmit
its knowledge to the user and directly caused the accident in
question. But in the latter case the manufacturer was not found
65 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. N.Y. 1951).
60 Id. at 98.
672
15 Ark. 630, 222 S.W. 2d 820 (1949).
68
Plaintiff's crop was ths of a mile from the area being dusted.
69 "If one casts into the air a substance which he knows may do damage to
others,... principles of elementary justice as well as the best public policy require
that he know how far the substance will carry or be conveyed through the air and
what damage it will do in the path of its journey, and if he releases such a substance either from ignorance of, or in indifference to the damage that may be
done, the rule of strict liability should be applied." 222 S.W. 2d at 827.
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to have knowledge of the destructive qualities of its dust. This
seems to bring about a sort of absolute liability based on a conclusive presumption of knowledge of all the possible inherent
dangers of a product put on the market by a producer. The
courts have limited this principle to dangers which are reasonably
forseeable.
The MacPhersoncase expressly refused to take up the question of whether the manufacturer of component parts would also
be liable. 70 In a later case in he same jurisdiction 7l the court
found that the manufacturer of a component part would be
jointly liable with the manufacturer of the finished product if
both were negligent in not making a reasonable inspection of the
product before putting it on the market. Thus the maker of component parts was brought within the MacPhersonrule.
The only remaining logical extension of MacPherson came
some 16 years later. In the earlier case the liability was limited to
injuries to a person. In Genessee County Patrons FireRelief Ass'n
v. Sonneborn72 the court found that injuries to property were just
as foreseeable as injuries to persons and it placed property dam3
ages within the rule.

7

Thus the circle of liability was completed. A manufacturer of
a defective component which caused an atomic accident could be
held liable not only for the personal injuries caused by it but also
for the property damage which might ensue. With this in mind
the manufacturer of the finished product and the manufacturer
of the component parts, if there be two, should stand together to
perfect their production and inspection techniques since the
probability of liability is clearly pointed out. As yet the manufacturers have not seen fit to seek insurance against this possibility.
70 'We think the defendant was not absolved from a duty of inspection because it bought the wheels from a reputable manufacturer ...It was not at liberty
to put the finished product on the market without subjecting the component parts
to ordinary and simple tests." 111 N.E. at 1055.
71 Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932). The component part was a bottle and the assembled product was the bottle filled with
soda. See also the Rest., Torts secs. 265, 266.
72 263 N.Y. 463, 189 N.E. 551 (1934).
73
However, the court did find that the product was inherently dangerous.
The question is whether the cases following the MacPherson extension of liability
can be considered as furthering the doctrine when they deal with items inherently
dangerous and which would have brought liability for negligent construction even
before MacPherson.
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The Vulnerability of the Designer
Two recent cases74 arising from the same occurrence have
raised the question of whether the designer of an object causing
injury is liable for negligence in his design. Such a concept extends the MacPhersondoctrine back to the inception of the product. In a field as experimental as that of atomic energy industry
it presents a cloud of colossal proportions. 75 To the owner and
operator, the manufacturer, and supplier in the ring of liability
must be added the designer of the instrumentality.
A plan was worked out to store natural gas at 2600 below zero
F. in a liquid form so as to have a reserve for maximum consumption periods during the winter. A "giant thermos bottle
type" of tank was constructed with an insulation between walls.
The defendant had constructed such tanks in a circular design in
1940. In 1942 the gas company wished to build a larger tank. The
new tank was to be cylindrical rather than spherical. After construction the tank ruptured and gas escaped. There was a fire,
explosions and a disaster destroying property and taking lives.
Suit was brought in the federal court of Pennsylvania on diversity
of citizenship.7 The first theory of liability was one of nuisance.
The court found that the Ohio rule made liability depend upon
the degree of potential injury compared with the utility of the
act and common usage. However, the defendant did not own the
tank and only supplied the materials and built it. The second
charge of liability was for negligence in planning the tank and in
the selection of the materials used therein. The court found for
the plaintiff here and was affirmed on appeal.
In a case brought in Pennsylvania 77 for the same accident it
was alleged that the construction of the tank was negligently
done and that inadequate studies were made in its design. The
defense was that the type of tank was agreed upon only after con74 Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F. 2d 908 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948); Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 363 Pa.
1, 68 A. 2d 517 (1949).
75 "The tragic accident in which [the plaintiff] and others lost their lives was
a poignant episode in the development of the kind of bold and ingenious engineering for which Americans have become famous. We all enjoy the benefits of the
results of these experiments; the question which the courts have to decide is at
whose risk they are to be carried on." 166 F. 2d at 911.
70 Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., supra.
771Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., supra.
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sultation with experts. However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment for plaintiff.
If the decisions in these cases represent the trend of authority,
and the two courts of decision did not feel that they were creating
any new principles of law, then the liability for negligent construction of a manufactured product may lie against the seller, the
assembler of the component parts, the manufacturer of component
parts and even the designer of the finished item. This list of
possible defendants is not enough to insure sufficient capital to
insure against a possible loss but it indicates how many parties
could become involved in a disaster of great proportions. In a
field as experimental as that of atomic energy the developments
will come so rapidly that complete testing may not be feasible.
Like the jet-planes of today the finished product may be obsolete
before it can be put into production. The fear of possible liability
may tend to dampen the enthusiasm of designers of new items.
However, a close reading of the cases above indicates that there
was much actual negligence involved and an almost flagrant disregard of danger warnings. Thus, it would appear that a failure
to make experiments sufficient to resolve the least doubt would
not be considered negligent in a proper case. Unlike the manufacturer the designer is not held to know of every possible ramification of his creation. He should be only held to know that which
he could reasonably be expected to know.
Some have suggested that this liability might be limited by
contract. It is felt that this would not be feasible in light of the
desire of the courts to protect the public from harm caused by
78
someone's carelessness.
INSURANCE FOR THE ATOMIC INDUsTRY 79

Insurance is one of the factors which business men first think
of when determining whether or not to invest money in a new
78 See MacMackin, Insurance Problems of the Atomic Industry, 1954 Ins.
L. J. 726, 727.
79 As pointed out on page one of the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., Preliminary Report on Financial Protection Against Atomic Hazards, (1956) the use

of the term insurance is perhaps too narrow to describe the problem area. "Because private insurance is the most common method of meeting risks, the problem
has generally been called the Atomic 'insurance' problem. We think that designation is too narrow. Insurance is only one of a number of ways in which the risk
can be met ......
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venture or field. Success in business is to a large degree dependent on the ability of the individual business man's or of the
corporate directors' ability to appreciate the risks incident to a
particular enterprise and to provide for them. Part of the technique of providingfor the risks of loss in an enterprise is to shift
the risk of loss to another or others.80 And this of course requires
an identification of the risk and some estimate of the probability
of the risk becoming in fact a loss.
One of the sources of loss which a business enterprise is faced
with is the destruction of its property by the forces of nature
such as fire, flood, and hurricanes; another is industrial accidents
such as explosions. Protection against losses of this type is obtained by means of insurance. Insurance also furnishes protection
from losses resulting from legal liability imposed on the business
due to injuries which it inflicts on persons and property.
Tim
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Risks Within the Industry
The atomic energy industry like other industries will have to
bear the risk of injury to its employees and damage to or destruction of its property. 81 In addition to industrial hazards heretofore
familiar to industry, the atomic industry will be faced with the
hazard of radiation exposure of employees and the contamination
of buildings and equipment by nuclear material. 2
Workmen's Compensation Acts have in general shifted the
burden of financial liability to the employer whether or not the
injury to an employee was due to the employer's negligence or
his own.83 Thus, the employer in the atomic energy industry can
count on being legally liable for radiation injury to his employees
as well as other injuries.84 In this respect it has been pointed out
80
1Patterson, Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24
Colum. L. Rev. 335, 359.

81 Id.
82 Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, supra note 7, at 126: "Many States have

already modified their workmen's compensation laws and regulations to permit
coverage for radiation injuries." Gray, Canadian Experience With a Major Reactor
Breakdown, Third Annual Conference, Atomic Energy in Industry 162 (1955).
Braideck, The Problems of Insurance in Atomic Energy Development, 1955 Ins.
L. J. 743.
83 Prosser 382.
84 Supra note 9.
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that accidents involving radiation injuries introduce two new
aspects into industrial risk: all of the workmen in a plant may
become casualties at the same instant, and radiation injury may
go undetected for a long period of time."-"
In addition to the familiar industrial hazards, the atomic age
8 due to conwill have that of the loss of "use and occupancy"
87
tamination by escaping fissionable material.
PUBLIC LiABm=n

It is generally assumed that the doctrine of liability without
fault or strict liability as first enunciated in Rylands v. Fletcher
will be applied by the courts to the new atomic industry. The
doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 88 is also expected to

apply. As they pertain to the atomic industry these doctrines
enunciated in the preceding sections, if applied by the courts after
an accident in which a runaway atomic reactor introduces radioactive material into the atmosphere or pollutes a body of water
with the resultant widespread property contamination and personal injuries that could occur under the right weather conditions,
could result in enormous financial liability.89 For example if a
reactor at a power plant near a large city should, due to a mal'function, eject a large amount of radioactive material into the
atmosphere and that material be borne to the city by a prevailing
wind, damage to persons and property in excess of that at Texas
City"0 might well occur. In this case the reactor operator as well
85 Bratter, Reactor Insurance Risks Still Unsolved, 55 Pub. Ut. Fort. 755
(1955).
sVance, Insurance 1029 (3rd ed. 1951) describes use and occupancy insurance as follows: "This form of insurance, sometimes referred to as 'business
interruption' insurance, is designed to protect the insured from loss to his business
due to his inability to use the building destroyed by fire during the time required
for its reconstruction." For examples of loss of use and occupancy due to radioactive contamination see Braideck, The Problem of Insurance in Atomic Energy
Developments, 1955 Ins. L. J.743.
87 Braideck, The Problem of Insurance in Atomic Energy Developments, 1955
Ins. L. J.743.
88 See note 31, supra.
89 Weil, Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants, 121 Science 315 (1955). It has

been suggested that even if no one is killed, a large city or a major watershed

area might have to be abandoned, McCullouch, Miles and Teller, The Safety of

Nuclear Reactors 13 (1955).
90 If the Government had not escaped liability for the Texas City disaster it is
estimated that it would have had to pay a bill of about $200,000,000. See Dalehite
v. United States, 840 U.S. 15, 17, 73 Sup. Ct. 956, 97 L. ed. 1477 (1953) relative
to Government liability in that disaster.
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as the designer and manufacturer, under the Rylands and MacPherson doctrines might well be held liable in damages in
amounts heretofore unheard of."
EFFECTS OF THE RisKs UPON T=E ATOMIC ENERGY INDusTRY

Effects of Risks Within the Industry
The problem of insurance against liability for injury to employees and for damage to the reactor and plant appears to be
capable of solution by private insurance companies and the atomic
industry. 2 Enough data has been compiled during the operation
of AEC installations and the experience gained insuring emp~oyees of the AEC to form a basis for risk calculation for private
insurers. 93 The Chalk River incident 4 has furnished some data
as to loss of "use and occupancy" to be expected while decontamination is carried out.9 5 This accident and the experiments or tests
conducted by the AEC9" have also furnished some basis for the
evaluation of property damage to the reactor and the plant. Private insurance groups have indicated their willingness to insure
against the risk of loss from these sources.97 There is no indication
91 See Speech of Clark C. Vogel, note 58, supra. Total damage from a reactor
accident has been estimated to range from $18,000,000 to $950,000,000. See
Parkes, Financial Aspects of a Major Reactor Accident.
0 Stratton, Underwriting of Risks Within Plants of United States Atomic
Energy Commission, 17 Insurance Counsel 481 (1950). Colonel Stratton of the
Travelers Insurance Companies relates how, by a coding system. security at AEC
plants could be penetrated to give insurance companies the data necessary to
evaluate the risks involved and to insure workers. Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy, supra note 7, art. 127: "The insurance industry can cover the atomic
power plant risks involved to the same extent it normally does in hazardous industries."
9
3 Dean, The Impact of the Atom on Law, 12 Pitt. L. Rev. 514 (1951)
states that only two men have been killed in atomic projects for the millions of
man-hours worked. Col. Stratton. quoted in the Problem of Insurance in Atomic
Energy Developments, 1955 Ins. L. J. 743 (1955), speaking on insuring personnel
within AEC plants: . . . [T]hrough continuous resurveys and the application of
coding, together with a reasonable quantity of actuarial experience, underwriting
requirements have been lessened until today better than 99.7% of all persons
working in AEC installations can obtain their insurance exactly as if they were
working in an ordinary industrial plant."
04 Accident involving the release of fissionable material from the Canadian
NRX reactor located at Chalk River.
95 Canadian Experience With a Major Reactor Breakdown, supra note 9. Gray,
Reconstruction of the NRX Reactor at Chalk River, 36 Engineering Journal 1269
(1953).
96 Dietrick, Experimental Determinations of the Self-Regulation and Safety of
Operating Water-Moderated Reactors 21-25 (1955.)
97 Interview with Mr. George Norris, Counsel, Joint Congressional Committee
on Atomic Energy. Mr. Norris answered the following question in the affirmative:
Have the insurance companies expressed a willingness to undertake on their own
the insurance of the personnel within an atomic power plant?
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that private capital is reluctant to enter the atomic industry due to
fear of loss due to damage to the industry's own plants or equipment-or from fear of liability for injury to its employees.""
EFFECTS OF THE RisK OF PUBLIC LimAm.rry

The possibility, however remote, of a reactor accident of
catastrophic dimensions with the attendant damage to persons
and property over a wide area appears to be one of the major
deterrents to the investment of private capital in the atomic industry. 9 The liability for damages arising from such an accident
would be beyond the capabilities of the industry to absorb 0 0
and beyond the capabilities of the insurance industry to underwrite. 01' The problem was stated by the Chairman of the Joint
Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy' 02 as follows:
For its own part, the Congress now faces two problems of
great importance for the future of the atomic industry....
I refer to the problem of securing adequate insurance for
private firms wishing to build atomic reactors. . . Companies exploring the possibility of building atomic reactors
have discovered that they are unable to obtain adequate
insurance against the remote possibility of a major reactor
accident, such as could conceivably result in the radioactive
contamination of a large area. 0 3
The matter of insurance was discussed by several witnesses
during the Joint Committee's hearings in February and March of
1955. General Electric's Vice President, Francis K. McCune, expresses concern about the inability to obtain adequate insurance
for atomic risks. That inability might impede adequate financing
and widespread and rapid development, he said.'0
Another witness, General Electric's director of research and
08

Ibid.

99 Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., Preliminary Report on Financial Protection

Hazards, 12-13 (March 1956).
Against
10 0 Estimates (of damage from a reactor accident) vary from one to two
hundred million up to many times those amounts. Preliminary Report, supra note
99, art. 6.
101 Coverage in the amount of approximately $60,000,000 is said to be available from private insurance sources. Preliminary Report, supra note 99, art. 11 n.
24. Time, March 19, 1956.
102 Rep. W. Sterling Cole (R-N.Y.) January, 1955.
103 Quoted in Bratter, Reactor Insurance Risks Still Unsolved, 55 Pub. Util.
Fort. 755 (1955).
104 Hearings, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, supra note 6.
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Chairman of the National Association of Manufacturers' subcommittee on atomic energy, Dr. C. G. Suits, testified at some length.
Risks are part of the normal costs of doing business, Dr. Suits
said, but atomic risks may well be regarded as abnormal. Compared with the latter, those risks involved in the Texas City disaster or the accident in the Chicago power station'0 5 were minor.
A reactor accident with escaping fission products could be a real
catastrophe. The witness elaborated:
... [T]he potential damage might be much greater in dollar
magnitude than the net worth of the station operator or the
manufacturer of the generating equipment and auxiliaries,
and hence self-insurance is not possible. Insurance companies have thus far not been willing or able to write insurance for this extraordinary risk. From an insurance standpoint this kind of an accident is extraordinary in two respects. First, careful design and proper location of reactor
plants will reduce the probability of serious atomic accident
almost to zero. Secondly, however, if extremely improbable
combinations of circumstances should occur, leading to a
serious accident, the resulting damage claims might be very
great. It is this extremely improbable but not entirely
negligible accident for which insurance has been sought unsuccessfully. 105
Members of both the insurance industry and the atomic power
industry have expressed the view that the development of the
atomic industry will be delayed if adequate public liability insurance is not available; and that the insurance industry can not
furnish insurance in amounts necessary to cover a major reactor
07
accident.
PROPOSED SOLUTONS TO TE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC
LiAIrrr IN Tm AToMIc INDUSTRY

As noted previously in this paper the insurance companies
are willing to insure both employees and property within the
atomic industry. Their real problem is one of protecting the in105 Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F. (2d) 908 (3d Cir.

1948).

19 Hearings, supra note 6.

10T MacMackin, Insurance Problems of the Atomic Industry, 1954 Ins. L. J.
726; Bratter, Reactor Insurance Risks Still Unsolved, 55 Pub. Util. Fort. 755

(1955).
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dustry and the public against losses due to a reactor accident of
catastrophic proportions. This portion of the paper will be concerned with a consideration of the solutions which have been proposed to this problem.
Due to the fact that the largest insurance coverage written to
date is $10,000,00008 and the insurance industry by pooling its

resources is now able to afford liability protection to the atomic
industry for only $65,000,000,109 it is generally agreed that some

form of governmental action will be needed to protect both the
public and the new industry.
It is estimated that an atomic reactor accident of major proportions might result in liability in the amount of $500,000,000.""
The largest liability suit up to this date was for $200,000,000.111
Suits totaling $9,000,000 have arisen out of an industrial accident." 2 The difficulty faced is that there is no experience by
which to estimate, or even make an educated guess, as to the
magnitude of losses which may be expected due to a major atomic
disaster.1 3 Nor is there any experience in dealing with liability

problems which are said to be conceivable in this new industry." 4
It seems necessary that preparation must be made to handle public liability claims to an unlimited amount, at least in amounts
beyond the capabilities of the insurance industry." 5 The opinions
of representatives of industry" 6 who are potential developers of
108 Warren Unna, A-Reactor Insurance, Washington Post and Times Herald,
March 24, 1956.
109 See note 101, supra.
110 See note 91, supra. Mr. George Norris, Counsel, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, used the figures $500,000,000 during my interview.
111 See note 90, supra.
112 See note 105, supra.
113 See note 91, supra
114 The Preliminary Report on Financial Protection Against Atomic Hazards,
(March 1956) includes an analysis of four measures, existing or proposed, for
dealing with various catastrophes. The Report concluded that the experience obtained in these areas was not applicable to the atomic problem. The measures
considered were:
(1 ) Federal Deposit Insurance,
(2) War Damage Insurance,
(3) Crop Insurance, and
(4) Proposed Flood Insurance Program.
"5 "No unlimited liability-insurance contract is written in the United States.
Such a contract would be in violation of a common statutory provision which limits
the amount for which an individual insurer may assume liability on any one
risk to a proportion of its surplus to policyholders, and it seems improbable that an
insurer would be willing to write an unlimited contract, even if it were permissible." Mowbray and Blanchard, Insurance 164 (4th ed. 1955). See note 100 and
101, supra.
116 Francis K. McCune, Vice President of General Electric Corp.; Paul W.
McQuillen, General Counsel of Detroit Edison and Chairman of the legal committee of Atomic Power Development Associates.
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private atomic power as well as members of the insurance industry' have been that some action on the part of the Federal Government is necessary before the atomic industry can develop.
Federal Underwriting
In response to this need for protection of the public and the
atomic industry for loss due to a major accident in the new industry, three bills have been introduced in Congress by members
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. A bill introduced by
Mr. Price 18 reads as follows:
Be it enacted ... that-(1) for a period of ten years from
the date of passage of this Act the Atomic Energy Commission shall, upon request, indemnify each owner, operator,
manufacturer, designer and builder of a production facility,
as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and each supplier of equipment, material or services for such facility, as
interests appear, against unincurred liability to members of
the public for bodily injury or death and property damage
arising from nuclear hazards, subject to the condition that
primary non-governmental insurance against such liability
has been procured in amounts deemed reasonably adequate
by the Commission to provide against normal contingencies;
and
(2) each indemnification shall be evidenced by an agreement which shall become effective upon its execution and
shall cover liability for events occuring thereafter and during the useful life of the facility. 119
Mr. Cole, also of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, introduced a bill to deal with the same problem in a somewhat different manner.129 This bill provides:
That section 2121 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is
amended by adding a new subsection to read as follows:
i. In order to encourage the development and operation of
production or utilization facilities, the liability of those persons responsible for the design, construction, or operation of
117 Colonel Reuel C. Stratton of the Travelers Insurance Companies. See
MacMackin, Insurance Problems of the Atomic Industry, 1954 Ins. L. J. 726
for a summary of the views of the insurance industry.
118 Rep. Melvin Price (D. Ill.).
119 H R. 9701, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 1, 1956).
120 HR. 9802, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 7, 1956).

121 "See. 2 Findings.-the Congress of the United States hereby makes the
findings concerning the development, use, and control of atomic energy:
following
"a.
....

h......
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such facilities shall be limited in the case of damages caused
by the malfunctioning of such facility.
Sec. 2. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is amended by
adding thereto a new section, and by making the appropriate amendment to the Table of Contents:
Sec. 242. The Limitation of Liability-The licensee of a
production or utilization facility shall not be liable in damages for the malfunctioning of such facility in an aggregate
amount more than twice the original capital cost of such
facility. The aggregate of this limitation shall extent to, and
include all contractors and subcontractors of the licensee in
the design, construction, or operation of such facility. In the
event that claims for damages caused by such malfunctioning exceed twice the original capital cost of such facility, the
licensee may apply to an appropriate District Court of the
United States having jurisdiction of licensee in bankruptcy
matters for an order limiting the liability of the licensee,
including his contractors and subcontractors in accordance
with the provisions of this section, and for a further order
apportioning the payments to be made to such claimants
upon appropriate proof of damage."
The Chairman of the Joint Committee, Senator Anderson, introduced a compromise between these two ideas on May 25,
1956.122 In essence it provides that the licensee for the operation,
possession, or use of a production or utilization facility shall be
required to have such an amount of private insurance as the Commission shall determine to be adequate. In addition,
The Commission shall, until August 1, 1966, agree to indemnify and hold harmless the owner, operator, manufacturer, designer, or builder of a production or utilization
facility and each supplier of equipment, material, or services
for such facility ...in the event of claims arising out of or
resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other
hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or by-product materials . . . against that liability to members of the
public for bodily injury or death or property damage . . .
which is in excess of the amount of financial protection required, but not to exceed $500,000,000 in the aggregate for
within the United States and for each incieach 12facility
3
dent.
122
123

S. 3929, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 25, 1956).
It should be noted that this blanket provision will include almost all those
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For this service the Government would make a minimum
charge with the proceeds to be devoted to the AEC's research
and development program. 2 4
The basic ideas contained in these three bills, i.e., indemnification by the Government above a stated or determinable
amount of obtainable insurance, or legally fixing the maximum
liability of the operator of atomic installations, are the only solutions that have been proposed 1to
the problem of public liability
25
in the private atomic industry.

Summary

The bills of Congressman Cole and Senator Anderson seem to
adequately protect the atomic industry by making its public
liability definite and certain, and, therefore, capable of being
planned for. An ascertained risk may be shifted by self-insurance
or insurance. But an unknown and perhaps major part of the risk
is being shifted to the public. Congressman Cole's bill is not clear
as to what is meant by a "malfunction." This may mean a failure
to function properly although no negligence is involved, or it may
also include failure to use due care in operation. Senator Anderson's bill is much broader on this point and would seem to include both. While shifting part of the burden to the injured
public if no negligence on the part of the operator was involved
may be acceptable, it is contrary to our legal concepts to let the
loss lie where it falls when one party has been negligent. It is
engaged in the design, manufacture and use of atomic facilities. The following
subsection states that subcontractors and suppliers are included.
Another point of interest is that there is an allusion to the prospect of the
Covernment paying additional claims should it seem desirable. "The owner, constructor, or operator . . . shall not be liable for damages . . . in an aggregate
amount of more than the amount of the financial protection required by the Commission to be obtained, together with the sums set forth in subsections c. and d.
above, and any other sums which may be made available by the Congress for the
payment of such damages." See Conclusions, infra.
124 See subsection f. of S. 3929.
125The Preliminary Report, note 99 supra, at 29 supports the idea of full
reparation by the Government above the coverage offered by private insurers
which is the essence of Congressman Price's bill, but goes on to say that if the
burden is too great, Congress can re-examine the whole atomic power problem.
Mr. William M. Cousins, Assistant Director for Business Operations, Armour
Research Foundation, Illinois Institute of Technology, in a speech delivered at a
meeting held by the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., September, 1955, suggested
that a legal upper limit to the public liability of a reactor operator be set. Mr.
Cousin's idea was that not only should there be an upper limit to the public liability
of the reactor operator, but also a maximum limit to the amount recoverable by a
member of the public.
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likely that a limitation of liability to twice the investment in the

plant which has caused the damage as proposed by Representative Cole could be challenged on constitutional grounds.
The bill introduced by Congressman Price seems to have more
merit in that it furnishes protection to both the public and the
atomic industry. The requirement that the operator of the atomic
facility have insurance would give the Government the benefit of
the insurance industry's safety policing of atomic facilities as well
as the benefit of their organization and experience in evaluating
claims. Mr. Price's bill is thought to be defective, however, in
having the Government undertake unlimited liability for atomic
hazards. As there are no experience factors in the atomic field or
any analogous situations, it seems unwise to commit the Government to a financial obligation which conceivably might prove too
onerous. In other words, there is undoubtedly a limit to the
liability which even the Federal Government can underwrite.
As a compromise measure in essence the bill introduced by
Senator Anderson while eliminating most of the doubtful provisions of the other two bills, still retains some which might be
objectionable. It is not subject to the same degree of criticism
as the bill of Congressman Cole in that it limits liability to a much
more realistic figure. However, the constitutional objection inherent therein still remains. It must be remembered that this
measure of Government underwriting is only of a temporary
nature until the private underwriters can compile enough knowledge to offer complete coverage in the field. Furthermore, the
limitation of liability to $500,000,000 does not mean that claims in
excess of this amount will go unsatisfied. Precedent for settling
damage claims by private bills was established in the Texas City
disaster. But it seems reasonable to set some limit upon the
liability of the Government.
GETIAL CONCLUSIONS

While there is no case law 2 6 in the field of atomic energy to
suggest what theory of liability will be imposed by the courts
126 Cf. "The Commission shall have authority to settle or approve the settlement of claims without regard to the rules of legal liability in the State of the
accident, pnd regardless of whether liability has been established by the judgment
of any court." One wonders whether this is an attempt to set up a uniform federal
standard of liability without regard to the case and statutory law of the jurisdiction
where the accident occurred.
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when and if cases involving atomic accidents have to be dealt
with, the writings on the subject generally agree that the doctrine
of strict liability will probably be adopted by the courts. This
seems likely inasmuch as this doctrine is in harmony with the
social policy of shifting losses to those most able to absorb them
or further distribute them which is of growing importance in the
law of torts. As has been pointed out, even with a policy of holding
reactor owners and manufacturers liable only where negligence
is found, juries are likely to be very sympathetic and generous
with innocent members of the public who have been injured by
instrumentalities of large corporations.
What theory the courts use to take their money is of no great
concern to business men. Whether the judgment is a result of a
ruling of law by the court or a manipulation of the facts by a
warm hearted jury is of no real concern to the business man; he is
concerned with the foreseeability and magnitude of his liability.
If he can calculate the risk he can provide for it as a part of the
cost of doing business. One common method of shifting risks and
distributing losses is by insurance. But insurance is a business of
calculating risks and distributing losses also, and the insurance
people will not contract to underwrite losses for accidents of
unknown magnitude. So in these formative days of the new
atomic energy industry which the Federal Government wants to
encourage private enterprise to enter, business men have expressed an understandable reluctance to engage in an activity
where one accident might possibly result in liability for damages
to the public of such a magnitude that the entire assets of the
corporation or business man might be lost.
In view of the expressed opinions of industrial leaders that
the rapid development of the new atomic industry will be delayed
unless the threat of financially ruinous public liability for accidents in atomic facilities is removed or made calculable, and in
view of the fact that the insurance industry is either unable or
unwilling to insure against liability of the magnitude that may
be incurred, it appears that legislative action by Congress is
necessary if private enterprise is to be induced to help develop
the atomic energy industry to the fullest extent. In enacting laws
to encourage private industry to enter the atomic field Congress
should bear in mind that there are other interests to be con-
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sidered and not just those of business. Any legislation should
give consideration to the following factors:
(1) Protection to the public from injury to person and propperty due to atomic accidents;
(2) Encouragement of private capital to invest in the
atomic industry;
(8) Protection of the financial interest of the Government;
and,
(4) The traditional concepts of liability in our legal system.
It is believed that neither the bill introduced by Congressman
Cole nor that of Congressman Price is adequate if evaluated in
the light of these criteria. Shifting possible losses of unknown
magnitude to either the public or the Government for the benefit
of business appears to be unduly solicitous of the welfare of business.
The writers feel that a more satisfactory solution would be for
the Government to undertake to indemnify the atomic energy
industry against public liability up to a specific amount such as
the $500,000,000 set in Senator Anderson's bill. To be eligible for
this protection the owner or operator should be required to have
public liability insurance for the maximum amount obtainable
from private insurance companies. This amount has been set at
about $65,000,000 at present. Thus, the bill of Senator Anderson
seems in these respects to offer the best solution to the dilemma
which has beset the atomic energy industry. But, it is felt that
this bill might be improved by going further than it does at present. 2 7 In the event that an accident did occur which resulted in
more than the maximum liability assumed by the Government, the
Congress considering the welfare of the United States as a whole
could decide whether additional indemnity should be provided
to the industry or whether to let the additional loss be borne by
the industry up to the limit of its assets and then furnish relief for
the individuals who have been damaged by the catastrophe. The
further development of the United States as a leader in the field
of atomic industry must not be forestalled by the excessive caution
of the insurance industry, yet the safety of the people must not
be sacrificed to the ideal of progress. Since the problems are only
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how to best further the good of the people, the solutions can not

be far off.
127 That even Senator Anderson does not consider his bill to be final is
evinced by the following words: "This bill, like the principles outlined in my
April 26 letter, should be regarded merely as a basis for careful review and suggestions, both from the standpoint of substance and of drafting. Any comments
on the bill would therefore be welcomed." Statement of Senator Clinton P. Anderson on Introduction of Indemnity Bill S.3929 in the Senate, press release No. 56,
Office of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (May 25, 1956).

